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The Brandt Report North-South: A programme for
survival was published in Britain just over a year ago.
Within two weeks of publication the Report had sold
out and was being reprinted. (World-wide sales have
now exceeded 120,000an exceptionally high figure.)
Editorials, articles and reviews appeared in all the
major newspapers. Non-governmental organisations
and development groups reported unprecedented
interest in the Report and numerous public meetings
have been held in all parts of the country. Some 30,000
copies of a summary sheet on the Report have been
distributed by the Centre of World Development
Education.
The Report has also received considerable attention
in Government. Parliament has held four debates
specifically on the Report and the subject has very
frequently been raised in the course of other debates.
The parliamentary committee on overseas development,
a sub-committee of the Select Committee on Foreign
Affairs, has been conducting hearings on the Report.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office submitted a
Memorandum setting out the Government's position
on the Brandt Report to the Committee last July and
has recently submitted a follow-up Memorandum
(unpublished) summarising further developments. A
number of Ministers, including the Prime Minister,
have made substantial references to the Report in
their speeches.
Such interest in Britain in an international report is
perhaps unique, certainly remarkable, especially for a
document which some reviewers have described as
badly written and even boring. Of course the wide-
spread public attention the Report has received in no
sense indicates a simple endorsement of the Report's
approach or of all of its recommendationslet alone
is it a guide to the practical impact of the Report on
official thinking in Britain or elsewhere.
In most countries, developed and developing, the
response (if any) to the Report has been muted,
cautious and qualified. But this is not always the case.
Mexico and Austria for instance, have seized on the
opportunity presented by the proposal for a North-
South summit and are energetically working for a
successful outcome. The Canadian Government has
put its weight behind the same cause and it is said that
the United States' agreement to participate in the
summit owes much to the persuasive efforts of its
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neighbours to the North and South. The summit is
now fixed to take place in Mexico on 22-23 October
1981.
The initial British Government reaction to the Brandt
Report was cool, if not frigid. In part in response to the
unexpected upsurge in public opinion, the tone of
recent official pronouncements has softened. The
change is evident in the extracts from various official
statements presented in this Bulletin. But in substance,
present British policy remains largely unconvinced by
the central ideas and proposals of the Report, even if
in some degree it is professedly sympathetic to its
objectives.
Part of our intention in compiling this Bulletin is to
focus attention on some of the critical issues, especially
uncertainty and imbalance in the areas of finance,
energy and food security, in order to show the need
for international action and to urge a more positive
British response. The world economy is deep in recession,
with declining GNP being recorded in most major
industrial countries, For developing countries the picture
is also bleak, more so than in the mid-1970s when
initial recycling, high commodity prices and often
rising exports sustained a certain dynamism in a number
of countries. The prospects for the 1980s in most of
the poorer developing countries, but especially in
Africa, are extremely dismal. In all these respects the
position today, and the prognosis, look even more
serious than when the Brandt Report was published a
year ago.
The causes are, of course, by no means all inter-
nationalas Britain's own position makes clear. But
neither are they solely domestic. OECD's latest Economic
Outlook identifies three main, interacting restraints
on growth: higher oil prices, monetary policy and
fiscal policy. The combination of domestic inflationary
forces and foreign exchange imbalances brought on
by increases in oil has led many OECD countries to
adopt restrictionist monetary and fiscal policies which
have greatly reinforced recessionary tendencies
nationally and in the world economy. The Brandt
Report makes the point that it is precisely in times of
recession that the international economic environment
is not to be taken as given but should be actively and
consciously changed.
The cost of failing to achieve international change is
much greater than is generally realised. The OECD
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estimates that the GNP of the main industrial economies
will probably be 61/2 per cent ($550 bn) lower in 1981
than it might have been without the latest round of oil
price increases. The calculation is as follows (note
that no estimate is included for losses to the adoption
of monetary policies):
Two major Influences affecting output In the OECD
area, 1978-81
Effect on 1981 GNP level
Oil Estimated GNP effect
of 1979-80 price rises in
internationally traded oil
of which, due to domestic
energy price rises
Fiscal Policy Estimated




Source: OECD Economic Outlook December 1980, p 13
These figures can be interpreted in two ways: as the
cost to the OECD economies, substantially self-inflicted,
of oil price increases set in motion by some other
group of countries, essentially OPEC; or as the cost of
having failed to achieve effective international agreement
in this vital area which would have allowed steady and
controlled adjustment, rather than the costly, abrupt
and largely unregulated changes experienced in the
past few years. The Brandt Report argues for an
energy strategy built on a direct agreement between
the OECD, OPEC and other Third World countries to
achieve the former result; we live, in actuality, with
the consequences of the latter. But if the losses through
failure to take effective international action are so
great, why has the official response to the proposals of
the Brandt Report been so weak and so slow? One can
group the basic reasons under several broad headings.
In the phrase of Don Mills, former chairman of the
Group of 77 at the UN, the West has yet to cross the
philosophical bridge' needed for those proposals to
be seen as serious possibilities, not merely as academic
speculations. In fact at least two bridges are involved.
There is, first, the bridge of economic philosophy. As
Bird argues, the Brandt programme is based on inter-
national Keynesianism and it is for this reason
fundamentally at variance with monetarist philosophy.
This is both a weakness and a strength at the present
time. As long as monetarist ideas hold sway the Brandt
Report proposals are likely to be rejected on first
principles. But as disillusion with the results of monetarist
policies sets in, the alternative, comprehensive analysis
of the Brandt Report could well provide a frame for
international policies to complement new domestic
measures.
The second philosophical bridge concerns international
politics. To many in the West the developing countries
primarily matter, if at all, not because of their economic
importance, let alone because of any Western concern
with development, but because of their political rolé
in East-West relations. The Brandt Report treats this
view as seriously outdated. It calls for a fundamental
reappraisal based on the growing economic and strategic
importance of developing countries in the areas of
energy, food, key commodities and export markets.
Over the second half of the 1970s the developing
countries were the most dynamic part of the world
economy and did much to sustain employment and
economic growth and offset decline in the domestic
economies of the West. The statistical tables at the
end of this Bulletin illustrate the extent of inter-
dependence in certain critical areas between Britain
and other industrialised countries and the Third
World.
Philosophical bridges are important because they open
the way for changes of political direction. The Marshall
Plan was adopted in 1947, with a far greater commitment
of resources than the Brandt Report calls for, because
the governments concerned accepted a political
commitment to act, not because the proposals had all
been exhaustively explored in advance. Many of those
who respond positively to the Brandt Report draw
heart from this example.
The Brandt Report proposals add up to broad line of
approach, not to a detailed blueprint. It is true that
much analytical work remains to be done to elaborate
the detail and sort out the conflicting issues more
thoroughlyand with more analytical rigourthan
the Brandt Report itself chose to do. That very process
will support the argument for a universal need for
international change; and it is only on the basis of
demonstrated material interest that any government
can be expected to take major political decisions.
But our main purpose in compiling this Bulletin is to
present a cross-section of the wide variety of response
which has greeted the Brandt Report outside official
circles, and to give the key sections of the official
position itself for ease of reference. For this reason a
far higher proportion of material than is normal in an
academic journal consists of pieces which have been
published elsewhere; and we are especially grateful to
all the individuals and publishers who have generously
allowed us to reproduce material.
The Bulletin opens with an introductory summary





(per cent) States countries total
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the year since its publication by the Rt Hon Edward
Heath MP, the single British member of the Brandt
Commission.
The section which follows, The Official Response.
comprises a number of Ministerial statements and the
core of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Memorandum to the Parliamentary committee already
mentioned. Its cautious tone (or refusal to indulge in
North-South rhetoric, as the Government would have
it), did much to ensure lively public and Parliamentary
interest in the subject thereafter.
The next section, The Public Response. falls into
three parts. It includes first, extracts from statements
made by representatives of major groups outside
Government: the Anglican Church, the Confederation
of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress.
This is followed by a selection of the more pithy,
pointed and thorough-going statements on the Brandt
Report made in the House of Commons by a wide
range of MPs.
The extracts were chosen to bring out important
points in ordinary language and to reflect, as far as
possible, the overall balance of the debates in terms of
the treatment of disputed points. Following this, Laishley
describes the activities of the non-governmental
organisations and development pressure groups in the
campaign to rouse opinion behind the Brandt Report -
which in fact initially lagged behind, rather than led, a
spontaneous and still largely unexplained upsurge in
public interest. Several development groups have re-
ported that no issue before has aroused such strong
grass-roots interest and support as the Brandt Report.
The third and longest section, Commentaries, includes
three book reviews, two critiques of the FCO
Memorandum and three substantial analytical con-
tributions.
The reviews by Stewart, Bird and Henderson provide
three different perspectives on the Report: Stewart
writes frOm a structuralist viewpoint, Bird gives a
technically detailed analysis of the economic arguments
and Henderson writes as a committed free marketeer,
sceptical of the possibility of effective, co-ordinated
international action. The papers by Singer and the
Society for International Development are critiques
of the views put forward in the FCO Memorandum.
Green's paper extends to an all-encompassing list of
reasons, at different levels of abstraction, to explain
the negative response, with replies to each in turn.
Vaitsos argues that the Report is fundamentally
misconceived with respect to the real interests of the
developing countries and the heterogeneity of the
industrialised nations, and that it is unlikely to be
adopted for these reasons. Michael Lipton puts forward
a strong case for the need for official reappraisal of the
risk of default by heavily indebted developing countries-
and for the inherent tendency for the situation to
recur; the two points together make an argument for a
radical reorganisation of the financial system. He
analyses the instability as well as the inequities of the
existing financial system and argues for the need for
policies in this area to be urgently revised in favour of
the sorts of measures put forward in the Brandt
Report.
If the Brandt Report were to be taken seriously in
Britain, what would this imply? First, there would
undoubtedly be a change of economic philosophy in
Government thinking and approaches. As explained,
the Brandt Report is built on international Keynesianism,
not on national monetarism. While Brandt gives high
priority to reducing inflation internationally as well as
nationally and studiously avoids measures which would
stimulate it, analysis of these issues is essentially
Keynesian (or as development specialists might call it,
'structuralist'), not monetarist. As Bird recognises, this
difference is fundamental.
Taking Brandt seriously would also mean the adoption
of an international strategy for the resolution of Britain's
own economic problems. Obviously there must always
be a solid domestic core to any coúntry's economic
policiesand Britain is no exception. But in the case
of Britain, this approach would mean that the
international framework of recession, imbalance and
vulnerability within which domestic policies were set,
would be regarded as a variable not as a given. This
approach would be consciously outward looking and
would encompass a new and positive form of economic
diplomacy. Britain would seek through its numerous
international economic involvements, not damage
limitation, but international expansion, structural changes
and a framework of greater stability and equity.
This would not of course be easy. Britain is not alone
at the moment in adopting restrictive economic policies
domestically and damage limitation strategies inter-
nationally. The United States and most other industrial
countries (and some developing countries too) are
doing the same at the momentand there is pessimism
about the possibility of major international economic
action.
It takes an optimist to imagine a lead by Britain in this
gloomy situation. There is no objective reason why
Britain should not support such a lead, built on its
international interests, using its international position
and contacts to pioneer a new economic diplomacy
for the next decade. The North-South summit would
be a good place in which Britain could take note of the
large stakes which all countries have in an international
change of strategy, and begin to reconsider.
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